• Who has implemented a successfully chained service, with some propagation of identity?
  
• If you have, what architectural approach/technology stack have you used?
  
• How are you propagating identity - "sender vouches", "holder of key", "just trust me"?
• How complex is the chain? Single step, multiple steps, complex orchestration?

Service chaining is - in my mind - somewhat underappreciated as use case is identity management. It is being paid some lip service, but often put off as too hard to solve. Yet, many of the issues I face in the mapping of complex business processes to a set of decomposed services involves service chaining. For the purpose of this article, here is a simplistic definition (made up by myself):

"Service chaining occurs when a service must invoke another service to complete a transaction."

In other words, a user invokes a service A. That starts working on the problem, but figures that it needs information from service B. Now, service B is being invoked, but there needs to be good understanding on who is invoking service B to perform a satisfying access control decision. Service B should ideally know the identity of the user and the invocation path (in this case just service A) to perform an access control decision.

Interestingly enough, this process can be decomposed into two important steps: the final access control decision by service B, and a reverse authorization decision by the user. For the following steps, strong cryptographic identification through public/private key pairs is assumed:

Step 1: The user invokes service A (authentication and authorization occurs somehow).

Step 2: Service A decides that it needs to invoke service B for completing the operation and tries to access.

Step 3: Service B challenges the access request with a signed statement (access request statement - ARS) that documents:

• Its identity by including an identifier (such as e.g. a URI) and its public key
• The operation service A is trying to perform
• The identity of service A, again through e.g. a URI and public key.

Step 4: Service A receives the ARS and forwards it to the user. The user evaluates the request, andauthorizes the ASR by signing it.

Step 5: Service A forwards the signed ARS to service B. Service B verifies the signature and returns service A the required information.

It is obvious that this process it WAY to expensive to implement in large systems, but these are the steps that are - explicitly or implicitly - taking place in any service chaining scenario. It gets a little more complicated once you allow delegation of authorization, i.e. service A might have permission to authorize access on behalf of the user for service B trying to access yet another service C.

The two major performance impacts in this model are: (i) signature creation and verification, especially over XML constructs, and (ii) ASR parsing and policy evaluation.

Our effort to improve electronic health data exchange is starting to pick up some steam: After a very successful rounds of discussions at the HL7 General Plenary in Atlanta in late September (kudos to Andy Gregorowicz for covering this one) and a pretty warm reception, I presented last week at the NIH in Bethesda during the Tao of Attributes workshop on hData and our plans for the identity management and access control piece. I got some really great feedback, and I am hopeful that the idea of using a set of technologies that is know to scale (RESTful architecture style) can address the needs of a complex health data exchange.

Going forward, we would really like to start building a community around hData and L32. To this effect, we have created a couple of email aliases (see here for details) for starting a dialogue. 

hData ehr health care identity

I liked Bob Blakey's recent article on privacy, along with the paper he and Ian Glazer published. One direction that might need some additional coverage at some time is the “privacy of organizations”. Organizational sensitive data (such as trade secrets or classified material) follows a similar pattern of what Bob and Ian are laying out for PII: it is disclosed to a trusted group (as such it would not fall under their definition of secrecy), and a legal instrument (such as a NDA) is used to ensure that this data is not released to non-authorized parties. 

In my own world, I have seen privacy and secrecy as very closely related: to some extend, secrecy was to me privacy with a solid logging/auditing system, so that secrecy is really only preserved operationally, and full access to the audit trail would restore the identity (oh dear *that* loaded term again) of all actors. Bob and Ian obviously use a different definition of privacy, which has much stronger implications for the meta-data architecture, including sensitivity markings or IRM controls.

In order to draw a more precise distinction between different concepts of privacy, it might be relevant to examine the origin of the data about me (the data subject): 

• The first bucket is data for which I am the originator (source).
  
• The next bucket is data that someone I interact with directly collects about me, so they are the originator. This may include web server access logs, shopping profiles, etc.
  
• The final bucket is data that a third party collects about me, without me interacting with them. In many cases they are not the originator of that data, but instead collect other party's data (including myself). Note that data in this bucket gets particularly interesting when aggregated.
  

privacysecrecy

User-centricity - often expressed in the "7 Laws of Identity" - has been a common theme in identity management for a while now. At the heart of these principles lies the desire to empower the end-users of a computer systems and enable them to negotiate with the provider of service the amount of PII data the users have to disclose for getting access. Beyond the initial authentication and authorization steps for resource access also lies an ocean of other problems such as delegation, pre-authorization, and emergency overrides. These issues play into a vast number of use cases in very different areas such as financials, health care, and social networking.

At the same time, a rather important aspect of identity has been completely ignored: the systems we interact with and their component services and devices do have identities as well, and these identities must be managed with the same details as person identities. The need for non-person identity management goes well beyond the realm of security sensitive environments such as various government services: we are getting ever more dependent on a growing number of devices and services including mundane things such as smart phones and ebook readers, but also critical items such as health monitors. In many cases, high-value or critical services rely on less valued service (such as a health monitors that use the mobile phone system for notification). Overall, we are seeing a polynomial growth of interdependencies of such services of devices.

With these problems looming, it becomes more and more urgent to extend the practices learned in identity management for persons to non-person entities. The solutions for this new class of identities will have to be significantly different, since devices and services will interact with the IdM systems in very different ways and might also have significantly different needs. For example, while privacy protection is important for end-users, devices and services and their operators will likely be more concerned with secrecy, which might borrow from some privacy best practices, but be different in other respects. 

Interestingly enough, PKI has had a notion of non-person identities already for some while. We are relying on the internet PKI for authenticating servers to users and services. At the same time, PKI has been very cumbersome to roll-out to end-users and edge devices. As such, there are some lessons that PKI can provide, so that the efficiencies and abstractions of SAML and related technologies can to go beyond simple user-centricity.

As a challenge, here are some questions that I have with regards to identity management of non-person entities:

1. What identity can devices and services have? How are these identities different from human identities?
2. What are the minimal requirements on machine identities?
3. What new and different interaction patterns are required for enabling machine identities?
4. How do concepts such as reputation translate into the machine world? 
5. When machine and human identities interact, is there a need for disclosure that one party is non-human? Or human?

Title: hData - A Simplified Approach to Health Data Exchange

Interoperability issues have limited the expected benefits of Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems. Ideally, the medical history of a patient is recorded in a set of digital continuity of care documents which are securely available to the patient and their care providers on demand. The history of continuity of care standards includes multiple standards organizations, differing goals, and ongoing efforts to reconcile the various specifications. Existing standards define a format that is too complex for exchanging continuity of care information effectively. We propose hData, a simplified XML framework to describe health information. hData addresses the challenges of the current HL7 Continuity of Care Document format and is explicitly designed for extensibility to address health information exchange needs, in general. hData applies established best practices for XML document architectures to the vertical health domain, which has experienced significant XML-based interoperability issues.

Trust is one of those concepts in IdM that are hard to define or measure, yet are at the basis of most of our transactions. There are a few different ways to look at trust or capture its essence, including reputation systems, assurance frameworks, and similar solutions. At the end of the day, however, it most often comes down to this:

Basic law of trust (BLT): Alice will only trust Bob in a transaction, if the benefits outweigh the perceived risk plus her personal margin of safety.

Sometimes there are situations where we MUST trust another party (through legal requirements or lack of other options), but these can be seen as special cases.  

Now, applying the BLT, one has to manage both parts of the equation: risk (including the safety margin) and benefits. The benefits can be rather manifold, and cover all aspects of internet usage: services, purchases, personal enjoyment.

The risk on the other side can also fall into different categories: financial, reputation, legal, etc. In many cases the financial risks are most prominent: for example, when I buy some book on the internet, how can I be assured that (i) I really get the book, and (ii) my financial and personal information (shipping address) is safe and not misused. Obviously, I do have to trust the retailer and his ecosystem of partners (payment provider, shipping company, etc.) to perform the requested services to my satisfaction.

Reputation of the retailer does play a critical role: if I personally know people that had a good shopping experience at the retailer, and in addition know that there are (apparently?!) many good review by people I do not know, I am tempted to assume that the risk is not too big. At the end of the day however, it really comes down to this:

Financial trust - sue and collect: Alice will only trust Bob, if - in case something goes wrong - Alice has legal recourse and can expect Bob being able to pay sufficient damages.

I am not 100% sure if this is really at the foundation of trust in commercial transactions, but it seems to be at least one important factor. Obviously this is not a very optimistic point of view, hence the title of the blog entry.

The excellent article "Security and Data Sharing" by Mark Richard and Leslie Lebl points to a few very important ramifications that the less than ideal current data sharing situation with the E.U. brings and what the ratification of the horrible Lisbon Treaty would mean for the future of international security cooperation. The article also mentions the potential positive effects of the U.S.-E.U. MLAT framework.

What really caught my attention, though, was the authors' regard for the supposedly high European standards for data protection and privacy. They are correct in assesing that the implementation of the Privacy Directive varies within the various member countries, with countries like Spain or some of the relatively new members not paying to much attention to privacy issues at all. At the same time, Germany is portrayed as having a very high standard of privacy and PII data protection. Unfortunately, this is not at all the case:

While many middle-aged Germans do remember the strong controversy about the 1983 census (which was relatively harmless in itself) and the German surpreme court even recently emphasized a basic right to privacy protection, the implementation in the real world are a far cry from the supposed nirvana of "information self-determination".

First, it seems prudent to make a fundamental difference between the rights of the German population viz-a-viz the private sector and government. When dealing with private entities, Germans do actually enjoy a fairly high level of control over what information someone might legally store about them, how it is used, and when it has to be amended or destroyed. Reality paints a somewhat different picture, though. Over the last few months, a number of scandals have surfaced, cutting across the entire spectrum of privacy invasions: large companies have spied on their employees and customers using hidden cameras or collected and used profile data without their knowledge. Beyond that, a number of shady address collection agencies have sold millions of records including financial information. In some cases, significant sums of money were misappropriated by thieves that automatically drafted funds from bank customers through the ACH. Obviously, these criminal acts (at least those that have surfaced) are being investigated, and hopefully the judical system will be able to mediate the harm done. 

The situation with respect to government privacy intrusion is much more dire, though, and it would be fair to state that any resident in the U.S. enjoys a much higher level of government intrusion that any German ever had. For starters, every German (in fact, European) is now issued at birth an 11-digit taxpayer identification number that is unique and valid over their entire life. One might argue that the SSN is very similar in this respect, but there are two significant differences: (i) no U.S. resident is *legally required* to obtain a SSN and (ii) the FTC and the other government agencies have realized the ID-Theft threat that such an identifier poses and there is active work to limit the use of SSNs.

But the issues go far beyond unqiue identifiers: every resident of Germany is legally required to notify city hall within 30 days if they move  - either within their street or across the country. Interestingly enough, this data is readily available to any interested private company, and some 400+ towns and cities have made some nice extra cash by selling off these lists. In addition, all residents are required to own a national ID-card, which will soon contain their digital photo, fingerprint, and a practical RFID chip for easy data skimming. 

This list goes on, and includes absurd stories of mandatory public broadcast fees (which are sometimes collected from residents that have been dead for more than 400 years - but, being Germany, they do have to pay.. or at least the church where they are burried). At the end of the day, the de-facto privacy protection in Germany is not at all better than e.g. in the U.S., where at least a strong vertical and horizontal division of powers and an active community prevents a centralization that has become so typical for Europe.

Through Ian Fletcher of Burton: Peter Fleischer of Google is now facing criminal charges for failing to prevent the publication of a defamatory video on Google's video site - taking it down after 24 hours was not sufficient. While this is a somewhat extreme case, I fully expect an increasing number of civil and criminal cases filed against companies and government agencies for failing to protect the privacy of data principals: In the U.S. the efforts to standardize patient's electronic health records and federate access to this data will invriably lead to some cases of unauthorized disclosure. Europe has already had a decent share of privacy violations lately, but the effects have so far been manageable.

Going forward we as a society need to coordinate data access much better than we have so far, thus it starts making sense to star talking about privacy management as a separate discipline in corporate IT and process management. Privacy management is obviously closely related to information and identity management, but has a strong legal/regulatory aspect. Especially the lack of any harmonization of global privacy frameworks is a constant threat to globally operating companies. Some of these aspects will be discussed at the next Liberty Plenary meeting. 

tags: privacygoogleprivacy managementliberty alliance

Jeff thinks that my term describing the privacy situation in Europe is a little harsh. I cannot blame him, since the Europeans, and especially Germany has been working hard on presenting themselves as the global guardians of privacy. And, true enough, the rights that a European citizen has viz-a-viz private sector companies is considerable. Also, Germany's supreme court confirmed on multiple occasions that there is a "Informationelles Selbstbestimmungsrecht" (right to information self-determination).

Yet, when it comes to the government or its associated entities prying into peoples lives, all bets are off:

• Go to the U.K. and try to not be captured on a surveillance camera. Anywhere.

• Try renting an apartment or buying a condo in Germany. Within 30 days you must submit a form to city hall declaring who you are, where you lived before, and who else is living in your home. This data is automatically shared with semi-private organizations such as the collection agency for public broadcast fees, but also with anyone walking up to city hall that deems you a debtor.

• There is a EU directive that establishes a community-wide unique tax ID number far all citizens and residents of all ages. This number is permanent, and must be shared with employers, banks, and - potentially - insurance companies. Sounds familiar?

• All trucks in Germany are required to use a satellite-based tracking system to determine tolls for using the Autobahn. This data is collected by a private-sector consortium on behalf of the government, and there are a number of politicians suggesting this for all vehicles.

• Finally, Germany's "Personalausweis" (national ID card) is mandatory for anyone over 16. So far, city hall was managing this data, but since there are preparing to put biometrics on this one, there will soon be a comprehensive federal database of all citizens of Germany over 16, complete with digitized photo, fingerprints, and later iris scans.

The list could go on and on - I am sure that Robin has a lot to add to this list. Needless to say that there have been numerous occasions where data collected by government agencies has been "lost", stolen, or otherwise compromised. While we are talking about theft: Germany has paid more than EUR 5 Mio for stolen data about alleged tax evaders.

So yes, my choice of words might have been harsh, but unfortunately quite justified.

tags: privacyeuropegermany

The DHS Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee of the Privacy Office of DHS has sent a letter to the new Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, making some recommendations for the adjustment of the way the department deals with privacy policy and issues. Some of the more notable ones include:

• Compartment Privacy Officers

• Data Governance

• Interoperability and Data Integrity

• Overhaul of the 1974 Privacy Act

• Independence of the Privacy Office from the rest of the organization

These are excellent suggestions, especially when applying them as a whole: having a compartment Privacy Officer, that can act independently of the rest of the organization has the potential of channeling the efforts of the department into the right direction. Improved data governance, integrity, and better interoperability should really be on the agenda of the CIO as well, but especially in the context of E-Verify or Border control these issues also gain a privacy facet.

Overall, this letter should be a recommendation not only to the DHS, but government and private organizations in general (mutates mutandis). Major privacy invasions (as we have recently witnessed them en force in Germany) can only be avoided if privacy compliance is considered as critical to an organizations success as any other good governance principle.

tags: privacydhs

It took a long time, but it seems that the time for an older idea of mine has come: Jeff Hodges is reporting on a report he prepared for the MIT Kerberos group to explore the use of SAML tokens in traditional security systems. A while ago, I was exploring a similar idea - then with Eve and Nico - on how to use SAML attribute and bearer token in the context of the GSS-API. 

The ideas and concepts we had then would still seem valid to me, although a lot of things have moved on since then. I will definitively follow this, if only from a distance.

tags: samlgss-apikerberos

Oh well, I finally sat down and took the time to convert my aging main web site into something more dynamic. Since my - overall - quite reliable hoster gives me free PHP5 and MySQL databases, I took a closer look at Drupal, given its overall support, ease of use and add-on module availability. My first impressions are quite good: it was easy to get up and does not seem to be too hard to administer. Converting my exising HTML went well, although the default editor (or more specifically: the Drupal filters) have a tendency to get in the way at the beginning.

Now, one thing I will probably spend a little time on over the next few weeks (time permitting - haha), is to develop a somewhat more reasonable authentication scheme for my various web properties. I have a happy collection of PHP apps, this .NET based blog, and also some custom Java apps. So far there is really no identity management in place; a fact that has been a sore for a while. A simple SSO authentication scheme across these difference platforms is a panacea, but it should not be to difficult to achieve. I am looking actively into using Oauth or SAML as the token format, and a simple RESTful transport.

tags: web siteidentitysamloauthrest

Times are changing, and people have to change with it. Doh - another pearl of obvious wisdom, but there is an interesting application to the work life: while regular employment might change rather abruptly, business and community relationships usually do not. So while you might no longer be working for a particular company (say, Sun, for example), you would still be interested in continuing your work in a particular area of interest (say, identity, for example).

In this spirit, I decided to join the Liberty Alliance as an individual member. The new structure of the organization, combined with a reasonable fee schedule allows me to continue my formal relationship with one of the more comprehensive identity consortia currently in existence. While I have not yet quite made up my mind on how this engagement will be, I know that there are a number of current project in TEG and IAEG that stir my interest.

One of the most interesting developments in Liberty right now is the realization that a RESTful approach is quite necessary to extend from an enterprise-centric identity management system to one that can scale up to the needs of health care providers and governments. The need for a lightweight IdM and federation framework is indisputable, and the GSA and Internet2 have already demonstrated that the existing feature set in SAML2 is sufficient to build a meaningful federation. However, it will take the legal and business rules framework of the IAF and related efforts to extend these technologies into the realm of social networking and eGovernment where you cannot rely on having a mutual trusted partner in identity.

So, going forward, it will be a lot of fun to dabble with the same technology, only now from a slightly (or not so slightly) different angle. 

tags: project libertyidentityrest

As part of the new U.S. administration's BigDialog and Open Government technology agenda, the CommunityCount web forum is polling for issues that are relevant to the identity management community. If you want to make you voice heard with the transition team and the next CTO and science office staff go here, put in your questions and issues, and vote on the others.

Here is my contribution - please vote.

tags: identity managementpolicy

    I love foundational discussions - they always have the potential to fundamentally change my world-view, which is quite stimulating.

    Radovan picked up on my little piece on reputation. In particular he suggests that the question "What attributes should be influenced by reputation and what should not?" does not make any sense.

    I fully agree with this statement, but not necessarily with all conclusions that Radovan draws. As I see it, the question is not what attributes of an entity should be influenced by reputation, but much more about what attributes can be reasonably approximated by a mean-value approach such as reputation.

    In Radovan's example, the height of a given person can be precisely determined (up to an error margin, that is part of that measurement). The result of such a measurement--as long as it is reproducible--is the objective value of the attribute "height". It does not make any sense to attach a reputation to this value. But you can attach a reputation/"credibility score"/whatever to the measurement process (this is typically done through the specification of the error margin), or the faithfulness of storing this information in a given storage system (e.g. through the reliability score of this provider, determined by averaging over the subjective reliability score given to the storage system by its customers/clients). The aggregate "reputation" of this process (measuring, recording, storing, reproducing) can then be used to calculate the "reputation" of you saying that I am 147 cm tall.

    But--and this is important: your statement about my height (or the aggregate statement of the community about my height) does not influence the fact (if you want to use this hopelessly overloaded term) that I am 187cm tall.

    This is fundamentally different from what might happen with other attributes: for example, let us look at my "reputation for drawing aesthetically pleasing pictures". While I ( or my daughter) might be convinced that I have a rather high score for this attribute, the rest of the world might beg to differ. My community-wide^[1] reputation as a gifted painter could thus be much lower. Note that I do not have any reasonable recourse: there is (fortunately) no final authority, or repoducible process that can determine a definite value for this particular attribute.

    Nevertheless, for such non-CFD, mean-value attributes you still face the same issues that you do face for objective attributes: there is the change of recording or storage failure, and thus other factors that might ultimately determine the reliability of a "reputation as painter" score I might have.

[1] Note that at this point it becomes very important to define the correct domain of your mean-value process, i.e. you have to fix an ensemble.

    Paul proposed a conjecture regarding the validity of using reputation systems in the context of identity systems. This (and some discussion on the IDGang list) inspired me to dig again through some of my notes regarding the ontology of physical reality (and thus--by extension--quantum theory).

    My personal position in the discussion on the most sensible approach to physial ontology was always firmly rooted in the realist corner: I completely reject positivism and--mostly-- empiricism on fundamental principle. There is no doubt in my mind that there is an objective physical reality, independent of human (or any other) observer^[1].

Reputation in information systems

    Now, a reputation scheme can easily be interpreted as mechanism to determine the value of an entity's attribute by averaging over the subjective values of that particular attribute, as seen by an ensemble of parties interacting with the entity in question. So, for example, to determine the "trustworthiness in business transactions" of user A of an auctioning site, one can average over the subjective opinion of business partners of user A on his trustworthiness.

    This approach is valid, and as many social (or even business) sites indicate very useful. It can be applied reasonably well to attributes of an entity that are either non-counterfactual definite (i.e. completely subjective), or not measurable by an objective and reproducible measurement approach.

    "Trustworthiness" is a good example for a subjective attribute, and credit-worthiness of a company or individual might be an attribute of the later type: while the fundamentals of a company determine its ability to shoulder a certain about of debt without collapsing, there is (to my knowledge) no definite algorithm to compute a simple "creditworthiness" attribute. However, the averaging over the credit ratings from different rating agencies (i.e. a kind of "credit reputation") is normally a good approximation of this attribute^[2].

    However, there are some attributes that cannot be averaged over: those attributes are counterfactual definite, i.e. objective and can be measured by a repoducible mechanism. A good example for such an attribute is my physical height,  my employment status with a given company, or my gender. All of these might change in time, but at a given point in time, they can be easily determined and have an objective value--even if nobody measures it. Applying a mean-value approach to these does not make any sense.

    One might interject, that for such a counterfactualy definite attribute there might be a different perception of its value with other entities. For example, while my actual height is 187cm (~ 6' 1"), some people might think that I am taller or shorter.  Now, my actual height does not change because a number of people are thinking so. It is my perceived height that changes and this attribute is entirely different from the former.

    So, in the end it is very important to evaluate carefully if a given attribute of an entity in an information system lends itself to be used in the context of reputation systems. In some specific cases this does make sense, but in others it is entirely pointless.

[1] Yet, while realism is vital to my world view, I am much more inclined to abandon local reality than counterfactual definiteness.

[2] The current financial quagmire is an example of how such a reputation system can fail.

    Amazingly enough, it took less than 24 hours to see the first massive privacy issues flaring up with Google Chrome. In a CNET interview, Peter Eckersley of the EFF says:

"We're worried that Chrome will be another giant conveyer belt moving private information about our use of the Web into Google's data vaults," Eckersley said. "Google already knows far too much about what everybody is thinking at any given moment.

    Now this is a total surprise, is it not? Not only can Google read all your mail, knows what you are looking for on the web, and has your financial information through Googlc Checkout or Adsense. With the Omnibox (or the mysterious "one or more unique application numbers"), they now also see all the places you go to -- on the internet and any possible intranets.

    Now, I do not know exactly how this will play out legally, but as far as I am concerned, the internal structure of an Intranet is usally some I'd rather not expose to outsiders. Beyond privacy concerns, there are clear security and intrusion concerns, and allowing Google to obtain this data for free and without any binding contract between Google and my company does not seem very prudent. If I had any say, I would strangle recommend to prohibit the use of Chrome in any enterprise environment. This should obviously extend to government agencies, and among them law enforcement and military. How embarrassing would it be, if--by honest mistake--the DNS or CA infrastructure of the combat command and control systems of say, the Airforce or the CIA would suddenly appear on a Google search result.

    Do not get me wrong: I do like Open Source, and adding competition to the market is always a good thing. I simply see the ugly face of monopoly lurking around the corner, and this time it also has a big file on any internet user. This is a little too much power in the hands of a single entity. If Google was part of a government, people would be a lot less eager to submit their most private data (with the exception of Germany, of course--there it works the other way round).

tags: google chromeprivacy

  Last year we announced an experiment at Sun: in order to gather more information about the operational characteristics of "user-centric" identity technologies, we decided to roll out an OpenID provider for Sun employees. This OpenID provider was intended to be used by Sun employees for personal usage at various OpenID sites that have been popping up at some places.

  This experiment involved various parts of the company, including field people, products folks, the security team, and our Chief Privacy Officer. We negotiated a number of requirements for our experiment: employee privacy must be maintained at all times, the system must not interfere with any other Sun authentication or business system, etc. All this was quite achievable and we passed the--albeit lax, since it was an experiment--security and privacy reviews, the focus of which was the protection of Sun employees and property.

  The weakness in Debian-generated certificates and the recent DNS cache poisoning attack vector resulted in a triple whammy: weak certificates, broken DNS, weak protocol. After Ben's report last week, we revisited the current design of the service and came up with a few recommendations. Mark Wilcox notes that my list could be hard to follow, especially for non-technical users. To some extend^[1] I do agree with him, so we decided to take additional steps on our end to improve security:

  The very core of these changes lies in the idea that we are introducing HTTPS based OpenIDs for our users. In OpenID 1 and 2, a RP normalizes any identifier without scheme prefix into an unsecured HTTP based identifier. Only a prefixing the OpenID identifier with the https:// scheme will result in discovery over an TLS secured transport channel. This looks a lot "geekier" than the somewhat more appealing "naked" OpenID identifiers, but as a result of this change, the lookup will now be handled completely over server-authenticated channels. 

  In order to make this approach useful, we would need the cooperation of OpenID RPs: in the current specs, http://openid.sun.com/user and https://openid.sun.com/user are two separate entities, which--in my opinion--makes no sense. If RPs would start recognizing these two identifiers as the same entity, it would help improve the security of the OpenID protocol in a quite significant way, since users could easily migrate from the broken insecure HTTP discovery protocol over to the somewhat more secure HTTPS transport.

  Obviously, this cannot address the key-reandomness weakness, but then ... only time can. Meanwhile we have to rely on CRLs and OSCP checking for certificate revocation.

  UPDATE: The approach outlined above might be criticized for equating two URI that are not equivalent (https://... and http://...). I appreciate this from a principal point of view, but extreme time require extreme measures ;-).

  A reasonable way to address the potential security implication for current https://.. identifiers would be for the RP to perform a one-time security upgrade: assuming that the RP recognizes a particular claimed_id e.g. http://openid.sun.com/user. Whenever there is a login with the same identifier over HTTPS (i.e. claimed_id is https://openid.sun.com/user in the example), the RP can 'upgrade' the account to an HTTPS-only account.

  On the OP side, any account for https://x.y.z should trigger the complete block for any http://x.y.z ids.

  Thanks to John Bradley for some stimulating discussions on these issues.

tags: OpenIDsecuritytransport security

[1] Mark mentions OAAM's strong authenication and risk based authentication technologies as potential solutions for OpenID's weaknesses. Maybe it is because I am not familir with this product, but I cannot see how OAAM can help with the weaknesses that occur through using HTTP (as opposed to HTTPS) for discovery. Likewise, socially engineered attacked can be effective in circumventing stronger authentication mechanisms (such as pictures or virtual keyboards) for less technology-sophisticated users: instead of their image, the rogue OP displays an error message along the lines of "Sorry, your personal image is currently unavailable due to maintenance. Please use standard authentication in the meantime." This might not work with all users, but I know enough folks who would login also with the "standard authentication" scheme.

This week's VRM Workshop at the Berkman Center in Cambridge, MA was quite interesting. It helped me quite a bit to sort out how Identity Management and VRM intersect, but also differ in some respect. To put it in a nutshell, I believe that the biggest difference between the two is that they are essentially two different ways of looking at the same problem. "Traditional" identity management has been focusing largely on the varies subjects (and objects), their characterization, and how they can be mapped to digital artifacts. VRM seems to be taking a more procedural approach by focusing more on the processes and interactions of these subjects, objects, and digital artifacts. In this sense, VRM and identity management are very much complimentary.

You can find more information about Doc Searls ideas about VRM on the Berkman wiki and on his blog.

vrm2008

OpenSocial and Liberty People Services are really tackling the same problem - only from two opposing sites. While the LAP PS has established a solid foundation for secure identity management, OpenSocial has started out to define an API for allowing social networking (but also other) software from different source to be run in one (or more than one) container. Ideally, these container abstract away the underlying platform and thus enable application portability. This becomes quite useful, since facebook, MySpace, Orkut, etc. have extremely similar types of applications (friends/relationships, photo sharing, contact management, and many more). Having these applications being portable across different allows application developers to focus more on added functionality and less on platform plumbing.

Liberty - on the other hand - has created the necessary infrastructure to enable individuals to set preferences and share information about themselves with other in a secure and privacy preserving way. The protocols used in ID-WSF and people service (and not APIs) can enable containers to communicate with others based on user's policies and requests.

libertyalliance opensocial

In my earlier article today I pointed out a rather significant security blunder in Germany, where a number of municipal IT departments failed to secure their systems. This lead  to exposure of at least 500,000 personal data records to the internet - so far I have not heard that any affected person was informed about their involuntary expose to identity thieves.

In this context it seems a little untimely to publicly announce a new electronic signature program that will start in 2012.Under this program, anyone claiming any benefits from any public source (unemployment, social security, etc.) will be required to use a smart card with a personal key. In addition, employer will have to submit all salary and compensation information to a federal, centralized database that will be fully accessible to all participating government agencies on the federal, state, and local level. Contained in this database are obviously all employer records, but - in all likelihood - also all data records of current or past applications for government benefits. Employees are expected to pay for these new services themselves, with private sector  financial institutions or government agencies playing the role of the trust broker.

This program is sold to the public in two ways: on the one hand, it is supposed to save the employers and the government agencies a lot of money by streamlining reporting and decision making processes. On the other hand, in its centralized form it is expected to help limit welfare fraud, which is quite common in Germany. 

In and by itself, such a database seems harmless enough: it has some tangebile benefits, including significant savings for the private and public sector. However, this effort does not stand by itself. Over the past couple of years, privacy from prying government eyes has been under the most severe attack immaginable: A comprehensive tax ID that is coma

While Germany and Europe in general have some of the strictest rules regarding the use and storage of personally identifiable information, the last few months have seen rather extreme data security breaches. Today, the German media is reporting about a new installment of irresponsible negligence government incompetence:

According to the SPIEGEL ONLINE a spokesperson for the software company HSH admitted that the personal information of more than 500,000 residents of at least 15 cities and towns were readily available on the internet for at least 3 months [1]. According to a investigative news program (Report aus München), this problem actually affected more than 200 municipalities for more than 3 years. The alleged cause for this blunder was rather simple: the software used by the cities to manage these huge data collections had at least one default/demo account that was not disabled by the IT staff of the authorities. These credentials were inadvertantly published by the software maker on their web site and thus available to every one.

While problems like this can happen, it seems odd that this massive security breach has not caused a major uproar with the various highly paid privacy guardians. In fact, there i svirtually no report on this incident in any language but German. One might get the impression that there is a strong desire with a rather large number of people to keep this incident on the q.t. and avoid further investitigations and public disclosures.

Germany has (or had?) after the horrible experiences with two dictatorships and their respective secret police a tradition of resistance against data collection and privacy invasion. The proposed general census of 1983 was stopped by the German Supreme Court in a decision that laid the foundation of what has recently been termed "Informationelles Selbstbestimmungsrecht" (right to informational self-determination).

So far, Germany has not seen a large number of identity theft cases: until last year, there was no unique ID  in use and most electronic transactions are currently handled through a European debit card system that is less exposed to a number of frauds. Also, while the various branches of government had been busy collecting large amounts of data on German citizens and residents, there have been only a few federal databases. When talking to people on the street, I found a growing indifference to the German governments extended data collection and linking programs. The general attitude seems to be that "we do not have anything to hide", and if a little (or even more than just a little) loss of privacy leads to a few high profile tax evasion prosecutions, everyone is happy.

[1] Germany has a national ID law that requires citizens to register with city hall and disclose persoanlly identifyable information such as names, current and former addresses, religious affiliation, birth date and place, children, current and former spouses, tax information, serial numbers of the national ID card and passport, and more. Since last year's July, this data also includes a tax ID, the German equivalent of a social security number.

While Germany and Europe in general have some of the strictest rules regarding the use and storage of personally identifiable information, the last few months have seen rather extreme data security breaches. Today, the German media is reporting about a new installment of irresponsible negligence government incompetence:

According to the SPIEGEL ONLINE a spokesperson for the software company HSH admitted that the personal information of more than 500,000 residents of at least 15 cities and towns were readily available on the internet for at least 3 months [1]. According to a investigative news program (Report aus München), this problem actually affected more than 200 municipalities for more than 3 years. The alleged cause for this blunder was rather simple: the software used by the cities to manage these huge data collections had at least one default/demo account that was not disabled by the IT staff of the authorities. These credentials were inadvertantly published by the software maker on their web site and thus available to every one.

While problems like this can happen, it seems odd that this massive security breach has not caused a major uproar with the various highly paid privacy guardians. In fact, there i svirtually no report on this incident in any language but German. One might get the impression that there is a strong desire with a rather large number of people to keep this incident on the q.t. and avoid further investitigations and public disclosures.

Germany has (or had?) after the horrible experiences with two dictatorships and their respective secret police a tradition of resistance against data collection and privacy invasion. The proposed general census of 1983 was stopped by the German Supreme Court in a decision that laid the foundation of what has recently been termed "Informationelles Selbstbestimmungsrecht" (right to informational self-determination).

So far, Germany has not seen a large number of identity theft cases: until last year, there was no unique ID  in use and most electronic transactions are currently handled through a European debit card system that is less exposed to a number of frauds. Also, while the various branches of government had been busy collecting large amounts of data on German citizens and residents, there have been only a few federal databases. When talking to people on the street, I found a growing indifference to the German governments extended data collection and linking programs. The general attitude seems to be that "we do not have anything to hide", and if a little (or even more than just a little) loss of privacy leads to a few high profile tax evasion prosecutions, everyone is happy.

[1] Germany has a national ID law that requires citizens to register with city hall and disclose persoanlly identifyable information such as names, current and former addresses, religious affiliation, birth date and place, children, current and former spouses, tax information, serial numbers of the national ID card and passport, and more. Since last year's July, this data also includes a tax ID, the German equivalent of a social security number.

• Interoperability with SOAP based web services is progressing: I was part of a panel on interoperability, moderated by Chris Haddad. It was a fairly diverse panel, with speakers from Microsoft, WSO2, Tibco, and Sun. While there was general agreement on the usefulness of the more basic WS-* specifications like WS-Security, opinions differed on where the future lies and how it can be achieved. In my opinion, the relatively high fidelity of interoperability within the WS-SX family of specifications is a direct result of the proper standardization process at OASIS that these specs were subjected to, comparable to that of ebXML or SAML 2.0. Thus, it is my expectation that the WS-RX and WS-TX protocol families will eventually yield similarly good interoperability.
• For the "Demo that almost made it (TM)", we made some serious progress: After talking to Greg Leake of Microsoft and Jonathan Marsh of WSO2, I am quite optimistinc that we can get easily inject a Metro based STS and/or OpenSSO with WS-Trust and CardSpace support into the StockTrader sample application to allow authentication through a SAML token. At the same time, I think that this demo application in particular lends itself quite nicely to showcase the strength of the Liberty framework for web services: you have a web application that needs to interact with the Business Services and the Order Processing Service. Identity has to be preserved across these different tiers, yet privacy protection would be highly desirable.
  
• It was very interesting to see that Microsoft is continuing on the path of interoperability in the systems management area. Three years after we demonstrated MOM 2005 managing and monitoring a Sun v40z with Solaris, Microsofts System Center beta features an open source Solaris management adapter. An interesting question is where this code will be hosted ...

It took quite a while, but by now it is out. Please welcome the Windows CardSpace Information Card extensions for OpenSSO:

https://opensso.dev.java.net/source/browse/opensso/extensions/authnicip/

When I started working on this last spring, I was not even hoping to see this released in open source and part of the OpenSSO extensions family in less than a year. It took the goodwill and talent of quite a few people to get this off the ground, but with the public release of this code and the upcoming OSIS interop during the RSA onference, OpenSSO is now "speaking ISIP" ...

tag: CardSpace, OpenSSO, InfoCards

tag:Identity, CardSpace, OpenSSO

tag:Interoperability, Identity, CardSpace

tag:Identity, REST

Not about SCUBA this time: we are right now visting in Redmond so we can test our implementation of a Windows CardSpace compatible IdP against Microsoft's implementation. Eventually, we will (hopefully) make this code available to the OpenSSO community through an OpenSSO Extension.

At the core of the integration, we (Paul, Jiandong,Mrudul, and I) have integrated the Metro/WSIT WS-Trust STS into OpenFM and created a simple cardfactory to produce CRD files (a big thank you to Chuck from here for letting us use some of his Openinfocard code). While we are not quite done as of yet, we have made some very significant progress towards full interoperability while supporting the username/password token, as well as X.509 client authentication.

Overall, this project has already helped quite a bit to improve interoperability between the underlying technologies (i.e. WSIT and the subset of WCF that is being used by CardSpace) and I expect that we will be pretty much done with the core code base in the RSA 2008 time frame.

Many thanks from here go to Mike Jones, Nigel Watling and the entire Microsoft CardSpace team.

tag: CardSpace, OpenSSO, Interoperability, Identity

Another one done. IIW 2007b is over, and - overall - it was quite productive for me.

The biggest takeaway for me is that Concordia and OSIS have made - in my mind - a major step towards harmonization and better coordination. This was reflected in the results of the OSIS steering committee meeting on Wednesday and the following two sessions on Concordia. I am glad that all participants recognized the value of both organizations. As Mike Jones put it, it helps that there is significant overlap in the members.

Other progress was made as well by both groups - the OSIS interop planning session was very fruitful, especially since the planning committee prepared an excellent laundry list document consolidating all test that are in the planning for RSA. I heard great things about the Monday Concordia meeting (which I was unfortunately unable to attend), but also the Use Case session on Wednesday with Paul and Mike was extremely productive.

Finally, the OpenID folks are to be mentioned for making a breakthrough with their 2.0 release, including their IPR regime. I took the Liberty (sic!) to capture the moment that David et al. have been waiting for more than a year:

Overall, the atmosphere seemed a lot mellower, but I can not really follow Dave's conclusions - especially concerning his comments about Concordia and OSIS.

tag: iiw2007b, osis, project concordia

Mike made a very good remark on the OSIS General mailing list that seems relevant to the discussion between Pam, Paul, and myself about assurance in distributed security:

There's a reason that self-issued cards didn't provide any ability to transmit a credit card number or national ID number. The good news is that Identity Providers sending such sensitive information are likely to not be willing to transmit it to relying parties they don't have a business relationship with. Once you're using managed cards for payment rather than typing credit card numbers into web forms, you'll definitely have additional layers of protection working for you. [...]

I fully agree with Mike here: as fas as I understand, Mike is describing the IdP deployment model that Paul and I have been championing over the use of self-asserted cards for sensitive attributes.

tag: assurance, identity, cardspace

Paul found an "periodic" table of data visualizations, which is quite nice in its own right (Paul: I think I have seen a knowledge map of the identity landscape some time ago). But I certainly prefer this "periodic" table of ... beers (hmmm).

tag: humor, beer

In discussing Cardspace's relaxation of the SSL requirement for RPs, Pam writes

We now theoretically will have three different assurance levels going, based on three different ssl certificate levels (no certs, regular certs, and HA certs).

For there to be 3 Cardspace assurance levels would imply that the LoA is the same for self-asserted and managed cards. Is this the case?

• blame the end-user about their lack of security precaution and sue them for negligence,
  
• rest assured that no large number of lawyers will counter-sue them,
• offer the end-user a token of reparations ("We will cover 50% of your losses") and earn tons of goodwill for marketing purposes.
  

PS: Welcome in the blogosphere, Paul!

tag:saml, identity, higgins, liberty

[1] Paul Madsen made some interesting remarks about that name...

Paul and Pam seem to think that my stance on assurances and trust is hard-line.

No Assurance vs. Pseudonymity

Paul seems to agree with me to some extend while noting that a concept like self-issued cards can establish a stable pseudonym. I agree with this: both the Windows CardSpace system, as well as OpenID produce in their basic usage scenarios^[1] stable pseudonyms - not more, not less. But this conveys nothing about the identity of the user controlling this pseudonym. It is purely an authentication process that takes place, with no authorization data being exchanged. In fact, all authorization takes place within the RP system, solely based on the pseudonym. I called that the "No assurance" level, which is - a little - harsh, but still fair.

Pseudonymity and Low-Value Transactions

Pam has more issues with my analysis: initially, she finds it strange that "No assurance", pseudonym-only level of assurance is acceptable at all. Again, I might have been somewhat extreme in my wording: when speaking about "No assurance" I was speaking about a situation, where some authentication, but no authorization took place. So you do have (as Paul pointed out) a stable pseudonym, but absolutely no reliable information beyond that. This, I find completely acceptable to what I coined "low-value transactions" like forums, blog commenting, etc.

Trusting an IdP

Now Pam goes on to point out, that an arbitrary managed card provider has - beyond the certificate that confirms the identity of the IdP to only some extend  - no other trustworthiness to them, making them practically as unreliable as a self-issued card.

I agree totally. That is why I insisted in my earlier article that in order to gain any confidence in the token, the RP has really no other choice but to set the sp:IssuedToken/sp:Issuer (3.1.1 [ISIP 07]) to a WSA Endpoint that the RP is willing to trust. This trust is established through non-technical means, e.g through contracts, reputation systems, etc. But without this tying of the authentication to an IdP you have at least some trust in, you cannot have any reasonable level of assurance about your attributes.

The Energy Level Diagram of Assurance

Thus, I also agree with Kim: assurance is not binary - quite the opposite. For reasons of brevity (and laziness 8-)) I only focused on the two major categories of assurance for authenticated session. So here is now a somewhat more complete picture:

Please note that in this picture "No assurance" refers to completely anonymous transactions (no authentication), while the former level of that name is now name "Pseudonymity".

At the end of the day, however, I come back to the same point I made in my earlier post: technology (as long as it is not blatantly broken, i.e. insecure) bears no significant role in establishing trust or assurance. You cannot create a technology that has "built-in" trust - any technology can be deployed in a completely untrustworthy way.

Even a technology-centric system like SSL rests on the trustworthiness of the browser programmers (that put roots in the CA stores) and the CA companies themselves.

tag: identity, assurance, cardspace

[1] Windows CardSpace: self-asserted cards, OpenID: OpenID Auth 1.1 + SimpleReg 1.0

[ISIP 07]   Arun Nanda, "Identity Selector Interoperability Profile V1.0", Microsoft, April 2007

Well, this is over ... and on to the next.

The last week was quite busy since Mrudul Uchil (from the OpenSSO team), Jiandong Guo (from Metro) and I were scrambling to teach OpenSSO to issue InfoCards for Windows CardSpace and respond correctly to WS-Trust STRs. Overall, it went quite ok and this excercise uncovered a few issues that will help us make the product better. The idea is to make this code accessible to the general public as soon as we can - but please bear in mind that we had to make changes to WSIT/Metro and OpenSSO, and some of these are not (yet) considered critical for the products. Nevertheless, I will be working towards a release for the IIW 2007b timeframe, so that we can progress.

Eve posted a couple of thoughts and some nice pictures of the interop session ... go check it out.

tag: identity, interoperability, InfoCard, opensso

This comes through Lauren. I can only fully agree with her recommendation of watching and sharing this clip with anybody that has kids or is concerned about the security of our children.

This is very creepy and shows the high level of immorality of the toy industry. With aggressive data hoarders like this, it seems more urgent than ever to even go beyond an opt-in regime (which we do not - yet - have in the U.S.) and put heavy financial liability burdens on any company holding or handling information about children under 17. Also, I think that consent mechanisms for children must be changed in a way that makes it impossible for children and parents to consent to privacy regimes that can be detrimental to children.

What makes this even more scary is that local governments are obviously not fully aware of the privacy ramifications of these organized privacy violators. For example, the Town of Burlington, MA, offers through its recreation department a class (see here, p. 5) for parents and children to make special "things" for their WebKinz.

tag: identity, privacy, policy, children, ID Theft

Tim Bass responds to my objections to his earlier article on the immaturity of modern identity protocols. He makes the valid point that the maturity of a technology should not be measured by the time it has been available, but by the level of adoption and actual deployment numbers:

"On other other hand, I am measuring “maturity” by actual usage, and the proof of security solutions is in the actual adoption, not simply years of standards activity and vendor marketing." (Tim Bass)

I fully agree with Tim that this is a very important factor in evaluating the maturity of a given technology, probably more important than the technologies availability. In fact, my earlier post was not very clear on this. On the other hand, I do believe that an extended peer review with subsequent revisions does contribute to the maturing of a given technology.

It turns out that SAML and its related technologies (Shibboleth and Liberty) excel in both these requirements for maturity:

1. As I pointed out earlier, SAML (the concepts as well as the technology) has been peer reviewed since 2001 by a number of very different organizations such as OASIS, Liberty Alliance, and Internet 2. This extensive review process resulted in two subsequent versions, that incorporated security fixes and enhancements, as well as new features. It has very broad community and industry support from open source projects, universities, and companies like Microsoft, Oracle, Novell, HP, Sun and many, many others. For more information take a look e.g. at Eve's blog or Scott's presentation.
   
2. SAML has been deployed on a very broad scale. There are a number of not-so-visible financial and telco deployment that are huge, but also the highly visible higher education deployments (see here). In fact, there are few (if any) other web centric identity related technologies that can boast an adoption comparable to SAML.
   

So, at the end of the day, I still maintain that Tim's assessment of SAML as an immature technology is - at least - incomplete.

tag: saml, identity, protocols, cybersecurity, standards

Paul picks up on an article by Pam about level of assurance with Windows CardSpace. He emphasizes the important point that assurance is not only affected by the underlying technology, but also by non-technical parameters like contracts.

I would go one step further and say that LoA is almost exclusively affected by non-technical factors. To be able to put any trust into a given authentication system (let alone an authorization system) you need minimally:

1. A contract between the RP and the IdP
2. A contract between the user and the IdP

Both contracts need to have provisions for the following areas:

1. Data governance (including privacy assurances and data handling)
2. Fault handling
3. Data updates
4. Contract termination
   
5. Liability
   
6. Arbitration and conflict resolution
   

Without such a framework most authentication and all authorization systems are only useful for 'low-value transactions' such as blogging or simple social networking. Or - in other terms - there is no level of assurance, even if the underlying technology supports the most fancy certificates or crypto algorithms.

Obviously, contracts of such kind can only be meaningful and economically viable, if the underlying technology is not broken and has the necessary features to support such provisions^[1].

Now, as far as the Windows CardSpace identity system is concerned, there are indeed multiple levels of assurance for the RP:

1. No assurance - self-managed cards, or any managed card where the Issuer is not enforced by the RP
2. Assurance - managed cards where a particular set of Issuer(s) is required by the R

tag:identity, WCS, Liberty

[1]Thus, any identity system that relies on an universal federation (i.e. any IdP is admissible) cannot provide any meaningful level of assurance.

It seems that history is about to repeat itself: after Liberty formed, a lot of people wither felt left out or did not understand what all this 'identity stuff' was good for. Granted, Liberty was in 2002 about 5 years ahead of the rest of the market. At the time, I thought that this perception problem could be attributed to some abysmally bad marketing - I guess that this was only partially correct.

Today, the same complete lack of understanding is about to hit the "user-centric" identity community as well: Take a look at a post by Brian Huff and compare that with this post from Tim Bass (via James McGovern).

Both advocate (in so many words) 'a simpler identity system' (heard that one before) and 'authentication - and that's it'. Both paint existing standards in a very bad light, describing them as 'immature, confusing and less-than-proven  security standards' or asking 'Makes you wonder why people bother to call them "standard," doesn't it?'.

Ok, guys you do not understand identity - get over it and hire someone who does. The good old days where everyone was getting ready for the global directory and its PKI are over. It's not only about authN and authZ in these days, but about the much bigger business and regulatory issue like trust or identity theft.

It seems that the larger identity community (Liberty, InfoCard, OpenID) is about to experience the same pushback that Liberty was facing initially. Let us hope that our joint communication efforts today will help to get over this 'perception gap'.

--

Here are a few comments regarding Brian's post:

1. CardSpace, OpenID, SXIP, (parts of) WS-*
Are not even by the widest possible definition standards, but rather a collection of protocol specifications. Some of these are even proprietary, IPR protected technologies (e.g. SXIP) that are not even covered by a NAC. Also, why are you not including real identity protocols by industry consortia, that are free to implement like e.g. ID-WSF?

2. SPML, XDAS
These OASIS standards have - per se - nothing to do with identity. They *touch* upon identity and security, but are not core to it. Otherwise you should also include HTTP, IMAP, SOAP, and even TCP.

3. LDAP, SAML 2, (parts of) WS-*, XACML
The are (in a wider sense) identity and security related standards. But so are many, many others (Kerberos, X.509, WSPL, XML-Enc, etc.) that you chose to omit. And interestingly enough, most of these standards build on each other or are complementary. So where is the issue?

Regarding Tim's post:

His list of immature protocols is simply ridiculous: SAML - well established since 2001: go ask the Shib folks, who are running the larger chunk of the academic environment on this protocol. XML Enc and Dsig - yes, there are a few problems (authenticated encryption or key exchange), but none of these problems are insurmountable and have been solved for a long time.

tag:identity, saml

Kim writes about the recent Beta announcement^[1] at Windows Live! about them accepting Windows CardSpace InfoCards for authentication. Having gone through rolling out an extensive public new and experimental Identity System deployment myself (Lauren is currently writing about that), I can appreciate the work that Kim and his colleagues are putting in.

In the interest of distilling use cases for Project Concordia and other venues it seems worth pointing out that - in this deployment - Windows CardSpace is being used solely as an authentication system: You can associate any Windows CardSpace card (only PPID is required) with your account - all other attributes are still being handled by the backend systems of Windows Live!. Any additional attributes that your Windows CardSpace card can provide will not be used for authentication or authorization.

This is very much in line with my description of the "glorified HTTP Redirect" use case of Windows CardSpace: here the secure UI on the client can actually help in preventing phishing attacks. The biggest competitor for this use case is OpenID which offers (roughly) the same features, but employs a radically different approach at solving the authentication problem. With PAPE it is somewhat more phishing resistant, but at this point, the CardSpace-based identity systems have - from my perspective - a clear lead in this area over OpenID.

Both authentication technologies face however that same issues: they allow delegation of responsibility for authentication and a rudimentary attribute exchange mechanism. But they do not address the need of service providers to maintain ownership of attributes about their users, except in trivial cases. For these - business driven - issues you need a framework that allows advanced models of federation and account linking and  - most importantly - goes beyond protocols and addresses the non-technical aspects of identity management as well.

I think it will be quite interesting which authentication technology (OpenID and Windows CardSpace) will get how much market space. OpenID has a head start as far as IdPs and community acceptance goes, but Windows CardSpace has the backing of Microsoft and - starting with Windows Server 2008 - a REALLY large number of relying parties.

tag: identity, OpenID, WCS, interoperability

[1] The service has been available for some time now.

Yesterday, Kim Cameron picked up on a recent article Bob Blakley. The central theme is about Stefan Brands' criticism of OpenID. While Bob sets out to ask the OpenID 2.0 folks some hard questions about what kind of problem they are actually trying to solve, Kim opines that some of the criticism brought forward by Stefan (and Bob) is unfair, since it is out of the scope of what the original intent for OpenID was.

Instead, Kim suggests that there is a spectrum of identity systems which address different needs. Thus, all such systems including SAML 2, WS-Federation and - by extension - the WS-Trust based InfoCard identity system^[1] should answer the questions posed by Bob to OpenID 2.0:

"[Bob] argues that the OpenID specification should include an articulation of the constraints on what it is attempting to achieve.

I agree, with the proviso that other protocols, like SAML 2.0 and WS-Federation, should do the same."

Although I try not to sound like a broken record, I do have to come back to a favorite theme song of mine: Liberty Alliance has done all these nasty and boring use-case evaluations, requirements, and scope definition like privacy and trust evaluations. Interestingly enough, a lot of these often fairly generic assessments is indirectly offered to other identity systems through Project Concordia.

tag:identity, OpenID, Liberty Alliance, meta-system, InfoCard

[1] Kim writes: "Popping up a level, we need a spectrum of solutions to identity problems.  Ergo, the identity metasystem." This is - in my opinion - an obvious example of why the term identity meta-system is very misleading: here it does not necessarily refer to the 'meta'-system defined by the InfoCard architecture, but rather to what I jokingly referred to as the "Aleph 0 Identity System" - a 'true' meta-system of protocols, deployments, etc.
But such a 'true' meta-system is not exclusively a WS-Trust based replacement for HTTP Redirect (WSTBRFHR), like the InfoCard identity system .

There has been quite a bit of discussion about SXIP's recent OpenID Infocard token profile: Johnny Bufu, Peter Williams, and I had some email exchanges, Eve commented on Eric's blog, and Dick made some comments about his view on the IPR status.

All this is great, exciting, or anything else you might want to use for describing conditions of euphoria. And I do acknowledge the work that Dick, Johnny, and Mike put into this effort. However, the big questions that are still unanswered (at least for me) is: who cares? And: are we hurting ourselves?

The Bigger Picture

If I take a look at the deployment rate of new-identity-protocol relying parties, i.e. mostly OpenID and Infocard, the picture is rather sobering: there is little activity^[1] and currently also few signs that this might change. One of the interesting results of the recent OpenID project at Sun was that successful web property owners have little or no interest in outsourcing their identity system, or even only the authentication part of it (which is the only established role of OpenID or Infocards at this time).

The same kind of behavior can also be seen on a larger scale where the big application and service providers like Google, Facebook, or Yahoo! have little or no real interest in a truly federated/distributed internet-wide identity system, since it is not compatible with their respective business models^[2].

So overall, it seems safe to assume that any effort directed at convincing web property owners to adopt a particular identity system is an uphill battle. Especially, if they have to invest time and money into equipping their web server with a compatible relying party.

OpenID Tokens, Anyone?

Now, what would be required to use the OpenID Infocard token profile? In addition to the entire OpenID infrastructure (OpenID Auth 2.0 et al.), you would also need a - more or less - complete Infocard infrastructure. In addition, you would need to make sure that the respective parts are tightly synchronized ^[3].

In addition, none of the OpenID specifications have passed extensive peer review in an open standards process, have IPR issues plastered all over them, and are - pretty much - all in beta (or pre-alpha) at this time.While these issues have been discussed in the past, it still seems reasonable to point out in this context.

Rolling out a complete and fully supported Infocard infrastructure is somewhat easier, since Microsoft is providing de facto reference implementations for the card selector and the relying party. Also, the IPR situation is less confusing, since the OSP covers - as far as I can see at this time - a pretty large chunk of the complete Infocard identity system.

Who cares now?

For a potential deployer, the question is now: "If I have an (almost) shrink-wrap identity called Windows CardSpace, why should I start to dabble with the deployment and replace the built-in SAML tokens with OpenID tokens?" Besides the technical difficulties, there is also the issue that an OpenID token based Infocard deployment only allow what is called "auditing mode". Add to that, that most clients will probaby not have Infocards with the OpenID tokens installed, my initial questions come up again: who cares? And: are we hurting ourselves?

Most end-users do not care at all. In an Infocard-world, they just want to use the Windows CardSpace selector to login. If a given site does not support self-signed cards or a managed card they already have, chances are that they will simply go away.

The relying parties do not care either: most of them want to attract users to their sites. If there is a simple SSO/identity system they can deploy and buy support for, they probably will as long as it fits their business model. Many successful Liberty deployments attest to that. If it involves unreleased or unsupportable technology, potential patent disputes, or simply a lot of additional work, they will likely shy away from such a solution.

There are also no benefits to the IdPs: having to run a combined OpenID/Infocard infrastructure might attribute only to a little administrative overhead, but it does not really add a lot of additional benefits either.

Are We Hurting Ourselves?

My answer to this would be a decisive: "yes". While the OpenID Infocard token replaces the HTTP redirect with the much more phishing resistant Infocard scheme, it will lead to some significant confusion in the marketplace. Educating customers and end-users might help to some extent, but explaining the differences between auditing and non-auditing mode is going to be very difficult. This is why Kim is rather careful about not advocating it: it breaks his own 7 laws.

At the end of the day, relying parties will have to decide what they want to do - and it seems to me that the decision for or against a particular identity system (such as Liberty, Infocard, or OpenID) will not be based on tokens, but rather on the entire package, including vendor support, reachable customers, and overall acceptance.

tag: identity, OpenID, Liberty Alliance, SSO, InfoCard

[1] Especially when comparing this with the rate of IdP rollouts for these protocols.

[2] In fact, I would argue that the interoperability debates of the 90s - WindowsNT/Active Directory, eDirectory, LDAP, etc. - were focused on the same issue of identity. At that time, it was the software suppliers fighting over identity WITHIN the enterprise, since control over the user database was the key to influence a lot of strategic decisions.

[3] To be fair, this is true for all complex interoperability scenarios.

tag:facebook, identity, humor

tag:identity, opensource, opensso, ws-trust